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ABSTRACT
Ensuring network reliability is important for satisfying
service-level objectives. However, diagnosing network
anomalies in a timely fashion is difficult due to the com-
plex nature of network configurations. We present Mon-
ocle — a system that uncovers forwarding problems due
to hardware or software failures in switches, by verify-
ing that the data plane corresponds to the view that an
SDN controller installs via the control plane. Monocle
works by systematically probing the switch data plane;
the probes are constructed by formulating the switch
forwarding table logic as a Boolean satisfiability (SAT)
problem. Our SAT formulation quickly generates probe
packets targeting a particular rule considering both ex-
isting and new rules. Monocle can monitor not only
static flow tables (as is currently typically the case), but
also dynamic networks with frequent flow table changes.
Our evaluation shows that Monocle is capable of fine-
grained monitoring for the majority of rules, and it can
identify a rule suddenly missing from the data plane
or misbehaving in a matter of seconds. Also, during
network updates Monocle helps controllers cope with
switches that exhibit transient inconsistencies between
their control and data plane states.
CCS Concepts
•Networks→Network reliability; Network mon-
itoring; Intermediate nodes; •Hardware → Bug de-
tection, localization and diagnosis;
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring network reliability is paramount, and this
continues to be the case as the Software-Defined Net-
works (SDNs) are starting to be deployed [9, 23]. Most
of SDN benefits (e.g., flexibility, programmability) stem
from its logically centralized view that is presented to
network operators. This view materializes in the net-
work by configuring network elements with forwarding
rules that dictate how packets will be processed. Ensur-
ing SDN reliability maps to ascertaining the correspon-
dence between the high-level network policy devised by
the network operators and the actual data plane con-
figuration in switch hardware.
Multiple layers exist in the policy-to-hardware map-
ping [8], and SDN layering makes correspondence check-
ing easier because of the well-defined interfaces between
layers. Tools exist that can check correspondence across
one or more layers ([11–13, 24]). Part of this difficult
problem is ensuring correspondence between the desired
network state that the controller wants to install, and
the actual hardware (data plane). We refer to this prob-
lem as data plane correspondence.
Guaranteeing data plane correspondence is diffi-
cult or downright impossible by construction or pre-
deployment testing, because of the possibility of vari-
ous software and hardware failures ranging from tran-
sient inconsistencies (e.g., switch reporting a rule was
updated sooner than it happens in data plane [17]),
through systematic problems (switches incorrectly im-
plementing the specification, e.g., ignoring priority field
in OpenFlow [17]), to hardware failures (e.g., soft errors
such as bit flips, line cards not responding, etc.) and
switch software bugs [24].
We argue for checking data plane correspondence by
actively monitoring it. However, the choice of mon-
itoring tools is limited – operators can use end-to-end
tools (e.g., ping, traceroute, ATPG [24], etc.), or period-
ically collect switch forwarding statistics. We argue that
these methods are insufficient – ping/traceroute and
other similar tools do not determine what packet header
values can test for data plane correspondence. They
are also often not capable of sending arbitrary packets
that are required in the SDN context. ATPG provides
end-to-end data plane monitoring and can quickly local-
ize problems, however it is designed to batch-generate
probes for all network rules at the same time and as a
consequence it requires substantial time (e.g., minutes
to hours [24], depending on coverage) to pre-compute its
probes after each network change. This delay is too long
for modern SDNs where the ever-increasing amount and
rate of change demand a quick, dynamic monitoring tool
that is the focus of this paper. In particular, a major
reason behind SDN getting traction is that it makes it
easy to quickly provision/reconfigure network resources
(e.g., virtual machines being started in a cloud data cen-
ter). New network demands created by Amazon EC2
spot instances, more control being given to the appli-
cations [6], and more frequent routing recomputation
(e.g., every second [3]) make it even harder to ensure
data plane correspondence.
Our system Monocle allows network operators to
simplify their network troubleshooting by providing au-
tomatic data plane correspondence monitoring. Mono-
cle transparently operates as a proxy between an SDN
controller and network switches, verifying that the net-
work view configured by the controller (for example us-
ing OpenFlow) corresponds to the actual hardware be-
havior. To ensure that a rule is correctly functioning,
Monocle injects a monitoring packet (also referred to
as a probe) into a switch, and examines the switch be-
havior. Monocle monitors multiple network switches in
parallel and continuously, i.e., both during reconfigura-
tion (while the data plane is undergoing change during
rule installation), and in steady-state. During reconfig-
uration, Monocle closely monitors the updated rule(s)
and provides a service to the controller which informs
when the rule updates sent to the switch finished be-
ing installed in hardware. This information could be
used by a network controller to enforce consistent up-
dates [20]. In steady-state, Monocle periodically checks
all installed rules and reports rules which are misbe-
having in the data plane. This localization of misbe-
having rules can then be used to build a higher level
troubleshooting tool. For example, link failures mani-
fest themselves as multiple simultaneously failed rules.
Generating data plane monitoring packets is
challenging for a number of reasons. First, it needs to
be quick and efficient – the monitoring tool needs to be
capable of quickly reacting to network reconfigurations,
especially if the controller acts on its output. More-
over, the problem is computationally intractable (NP-
hard). The reason for this level of hardness is because
the monitoring packets need to match the installed rule
while avoiding certain other rules present in a switch.
This case routinely occurs with Access Control rules, for
which the common action is to drop packets. Second,
a big challenge is dealing with the multitude of rules:
Probe generation:
probe=(srcIP=10.0.0.1,
   dstIP=10.0.0.2,
   isProbe=true)
Probe 
injection
Outcome=A ⇒ OK
Outcome=B ⇒ Alarm
Q: Is rule 1 in dataplane?
A
B
probe
Probe collection
(uses catching rule
 isProbe ➞ controller)
     Flow Table:
1. (10.0.0.1, *) ➞ A
2. (*, *) ➞ B
upstream downstream
Figure 1: Overview of data-plane rule checking
drop rules, multicasting, equal-cost multi-path routing
(ECMP) etc. that all have to be carefully dealt with.
The key contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We present the design and implementation of Mon-
ocle, a data plane correspondence monitoring tool
that can operate on fine-grained timescales needed in
SDN. In particular, Monocle goes beyond the state-
of-the-art in its ability to quickly recompute the mon-
itoring information after a rule update.
2. We formulate a set of formal constraints the moni-
toring packets must satisfy. We handle unicast, mul-
ticast, ECMP, drop rules, rule deletions and modifi-
cations. When necessary, we provide proofs that our
theoretical foundation is correct. This formal treat-
ment of the rule generation problem is the key ad-
vancement over our earlier work on RUM [15]. We
also optimize the conversion of the constraints to a
form presented to off-the-shelf SMT/SAT solvers.
3. We go beyond the state-of-the-art by providing more
detail on how the SAT solution (computed in abstract
header space) is translated into a real packet.
4. We minimize Monocle’s overhead (extra flow table
space) by formulating and solving a graph vertex col-
oring problem.
5. Our evaluation demonstrates that Monocle: (i) de-
tects failed rules and links in a matter of seconds
while monitoring a 1000-rule flowtable in a hardware
switch, (ii) ensures truly consistent network updates
by providing accurate feedback on rule installation
with only several ms of delay, (iii) takes between 1.48
and 4.03 ms on average to generate a probe packet
on two datasets, (iv) typically has small overhead in
terms of additional packets being sent and received,
and (v) works with larger networks as shown by de-
laying an installation of 2000 flows by only 350ms.
2. MONOCLE DESIGN
Monocle is positioned as a layer (proxy) between
the OpenFlow controller and the network elements
(switches). Such design allows it to intercept all rule
modifications issued to switches and maintain the (ex-
pected) contents of flow tables in each switch. After
determining the expected state of a switch, Monocle
can compute packet headers that exercise the rules on
that switch. Figure 1 shows the core mechanism that
the system uses to monitor a rule. Monocle uses data
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Constraints:
1. match(R1)
2. ¬match(R2)
3. ….
SMT/SAT solver:
(x∨¬y)∧(¬z∨y) Probe packet
Packet crafting:
01100011100101101
Flow table:
R1: src=10.0.0.1 → fwd(1)
R2: dst=10.0.0.2 → drop
Figure 2: Steps involved in probe generation. Probes
for different rules can be generated in parallel.
plane probing as the ultimate test for a rule’s presence in
the switch forwarding table. Probing involves instruct-
ing an “upstream” switch to inject a packet toward the
switch that is being probed. The “downstream” switch
has a special catching rule installed which forwards the
probe packet back to the proxy. Upon the receipt of the
correctly modified probe packet coming from the appro-
priate switch, Monocle can confirm that the tested rule
behaves correctly in the data plane and can move to
monitoring other rules. To ensure that probing does not
affect the controller-generated network state, Monocle
filters out all probes before they reach the controller.
Before Monocle starts monitoring the network, it
computes and installs the catching rules. To reliably
separate production and probing traffic, the catching
rule needs to match on a particular value of a header
field that is otherwise unused by rules in the network;
moreover, this value cannot be used by the production
traffic. In a network that requires monitoring rules at
multiple switches several such catching rules are needed.
Monocle can easily check if the catching rules are in-
stalled by injecting packets that match them directly.
Additionally a broken catching rule appears as a corre-
lated failure of all rules checked using this rule.
Figure 2 outlines how the probe packets are created.
Monocle leverages its knowledge of the flow table at
the switch to create a set of constraints that a probe
packet should satisfy. Next, our system converts the
constraints into a form that is understood by an off-
the-shelf satisfiability (SMT/SAT) solver. Keeping con-
straint complexity low is important for the solving step.
For this reason, Monocle formulates constraints over an
abstract packet view [13, 24], structured as a collection
of header fields. As the final step, Monocle needs to con-
vert the SAT solution, represented in an abstract view,
into a real probe packet. Monocle leverages an existing
packet generation libraries to perform this task.
While we use OpenFlow 1.0 as a reference when de-
scribing and evaluating the system, its usefulness is not
limited to this protocol. Presented techniques are more
general and apply to other types of matches and actions
(e.g., multiple tables, action groups, ECMP).
3. STEADY-STATE MONITORING
During steady-state monitoring, Monocle tests
whether the control plane view of the switch forward-
ing state (constructed by observing proxied controller
commands) corresponds to the data plane forwarding
behavior. To ascertain the correspondence, Monocle ac-
tively cycles through all installed rules and for each rule
it (i) generates a data plane packet confirming the pres-
ence of the rule in data plane, (ii) injects this packet into
the network, and (iii) moves on to testing the next rule
as soon as the packet travels through the switch and it
is successfully received by Monocle. In this section, we
explain the creation of monitoring packets by gradually
looking at increasingly complex forwarding rules.
3.1 Basic unicast rules
The presence of a given rule on a switch can be re-
liably determined if and only if there exists a packet
that gets processed by a switch differently depending
on whether the monitored rule is installed and working
correctly. Therefore, the probe packet for monitoring
the rule has to: (i) hit the given rule, (ii) distinguish the
absence of the rule, and (iii) be collected by Monocle at
the downstream switch. We formulate these conditions
as formal constraints, and summarize them in Table 1.
Hitting a rule: Only packets that match a given
rule can be affected by this rule. Therefore, the header
of any potential probe packet P must be matching the
Rprobed rule. Additionally, Rprobed is seldom the only
rule on the switch and different rules can overlap (i.e.,
a packet can match multiple rules; switch resolves such
a situation by taking rule priorities into account1). As
such, for a probe P to be really processed according to
Rprobed, P cannot match any rule with a priority higher
than the priority of Rprobed.
Distinguishing the absence of a monitored
rule: Even the rules with priority lower than the probed
rule Rprobed affect the probe generation. For example,
if the probe matches a low priority rule Rlow that for-
wards packets to the same port as Rprobed, there is no
way to determine if Rprobed is installed or not. Thus
the probe has to avoid any such rule. Again, there is an
intricate difference between a packet matching a rule R
and being processed by R. Notably, if we just prevent
P from matching all lower-priority rules with the same
outcome, we may fail to generate a probe despite the
fact that a valid probe exists. Consider a following set
of rules (from lowest to highest priority):
• Rlowest := match(srcIP=∗, dstIP=∗) → fwd(1),
i.e., default forwarding rule
• Rlower := match(srcIP=10.0.0.1, dstIP=∗) →
fwd(2), i.e., traffic engineering diverts some flows
• Rprobed := match(srcIP=10.0.0.1, dstIP=10.0.0.2)→
fwd(1), i.e., override specific flow, e.g., for low
latency
1 According to the OpenFlow specification, the behav-
ior when overlapping rules have the same priority is un-
defined. Therefore, we do not consider such a situation.
3
Hit Matches(probe,Rprobed) ∧ ∀R ∈ HigherPriority(Rules,Rprobed) : ¬Matches(probe,R)
Distinguish
∀R ∈ LowerPriority(Rules,Rprobed) :
IsHighestMatch(probe,R,Rules)⇒ DiffOutcome(probe,Rprobed, R)
where IsHighestMatch(pkt,R,Rules) := Matches(pkt,R) ∧(∀S ∈ HigherPriority(Rules,R) : ¬Matches(pkt, S))
Collect Matches(probe,Rcatch)
Table 1: Summary of constraints that probe packets needs to satisfy when probing for rule Rprobed.
If the constraint prevented P from matching
Rlowest (the same output port as Rprobed), we would be
unable to find any probe that matches Rprobed. How-
ever, there exists a valid probe P := (srcIP=10.0.0.1,
dstIP=10.0.0.2) as the behavior of the switch with and
without Rprobed is different (Rlower overrides Rlowest for
such a probe).
The provided example demonstrates that special care
should be taken to properly formulate the Distinguish
constraint listed in Table 1: When Rprobed is miss-
ing from the data plane, an arbitrary lower priority
rule RLP with the same outcome cannot be distin-
guished by probe P if and only if P matches RLP
and all rules with a priority higher than RLP do not
match P . To formalize this statement, we define
predicate IsHighestMatch(P,R,OtherRules) that in-
dicates whether packet P is processed according to rule
R even if it matches some other rules on the switch.
Using IsHighestMatch we can assert that the probed
rules must be distinguishable (e.g., have a different out-
come as Rprobed) from the rule which would process P
if Rprobed were not installed. For simplicity one may
think about DiffOutcome(P,Rule1, Rule2) as a test
Rule1.outport 6= Rule2.outport, but we later expand
this definition to accommodate rewrite and multicast.
Collecting probes: Monocle decides if a rule is
present in the data plane based on what happens (re-
ferred to as probe outcome) to the probe packet. To
gather this information but not affect the production
traffic, we need to reserve a set of values of some header
field exclusively for probes and ensure that a production
traffic will not use these reserved values. We then pre-
install a special “probe-catch” rule on each neighboring
switch; this catching rule redirects probe packets to the
controller and needs to have the highest priority among
all rules. Naturally, as a last constraint, the probe P
has to match the probe-catch rule Rcatch.
3.2 Unicast rules with rewrites
On top of forwarding, certain rules in the network
may rewrite portions of the header before outputting
the packet. Accounting for header rewrites affects the
feasibility of probe generation for certain rules. Con-
sider a simple example containing two rules:
• Rlow := match(srcIP=∗)→ fwd(1) and
• Rhigh := match(srcIP=10.0.0.1)→ fwd(1).
It is impossible to create a probe for the high-
priority rule Rhigh because it forwards packets to the
same port as the underlying low-priority rule. How-
ever, if instead of Rhigh there was a different rule
R′high := match(srcIP=10.0.0.1) → rewrite(ToS ←
voice), fwd(1) that marks certain traffic with a special
type of service, we could distinguish it from Rlow based
on the rewriting action. The outcome of the switch
processing a probe P := (srcIP=10.0.0.1, T oS 6= voice)
unambiguously determines if R′high is installed.
In general we can distinguish probes either based
on ports they appear on, or by observing modifi-
cations done by the rewrites. Therefore, we de-
fine DiffOutcome(P,R1, R2) := DiffPorts(R1, R2)∨
DiffRewrite(P,R1, R2). However, checking if two
rewrites are different requires more care than check-
ing for different output ports. A strawman solu-
tion that checks if rewrite actions defined in two
rules modify the same header fields to the same val-
ues does not work. Consider again rules Rlow and
R′high. While the rewrites are structurally different
(e.g., rewrite(None) 6= rewrite(ToS ← voice)), they
produce the same outcome if the probe packet happens
to have ToS = voice. Therefore, to compare the out-
come of rewrite actions, we need to take into account
not only the rewrites themselves but also the header of
the probe packet P and how it is transformed by the
rules in question. Formally, we say that the rewrites of
two rules are different for a given packet if and only if
they rewrite differently at least one bit of the packet,
i.e., DiffRewrite(P,R1, R2) := ∃i ∈ 1 . . . headerlen :(
BitRewrite(P [i], R1) 6= BitRewrite(P [i], R2)
)
where BitRewrite(P [i], R) is either 0, 1, or P [i] de-
pending if rule R rewrites the bit to a fixed value or
leaves it unchanged.
Finally, the rules in the network must not rewrite the
header field reserved for probing. This assumption is
required for two reasons: (i) if the probed rule rewrites
the probe tag value, the downstream switch will be un-
able to distinguish and catch the probes; and addition-
ally (ii) the headers of ordinary (non-probing) pack-
ets could be rewritten as well and afterward treated as
probes; this would break the data plane forwarding.
3.3 Drop rules
Drop rules can be easily distinguished from unicast
rules based on output ports— the downstream switch
either receives the probe or not. However, verifying that
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probes are dropped (a situation we call negative prob-
ing) brings in a risk of false positives: If the rule is not
installed but monitoring packets get lost or delayed for
other reasons (e.g. overloaded link, packets damaged
during transmission, etc.), Monocle is unable to deter-
mine the difference and assumes the rule itself drops the
packets and thus is correctly installed in the data plane.
While false positives should be tolerable in most cases
(e.g., the production traffic is likely to share the same
destiny as the probes and therefore the end-to-end in-
variant – traffic should be dropped – is maintained), a
simple trick can provide reliable information at the ex-
pense of increased network traffic. In particular, Mono-
cle can modify the drop rule to instead encapsulate and
send the traffic to one of its neighbors, which is config-
ured to recognize probe packets and drop anything else,
thus leaving the network-wide traffic reachability un-
modified. The details of this method, useful mainly for
monitoring of network updates containing drop rules,
can be found in our technical report [16].
Finally, since drop rules do not output any pack-
ets, header rewrites performed by them are meaning-
less and do not distinguish rules. As such we define
DiffRewrite(P,Rdrop, R
′) := False to fit our theory.
3.4 Multicast / ECMP rules
After discussing the rules that modify header fields
and send packets to a single port or drop them, the only
remaining rules are those that forward packets to several
ports (e.g., multicast/broadcast and ECMP). Such rules
can be easily incorporated into our formal framework
just by modifying the definition of DiffOutcome.
Both ECMP and multicast rules define a forward-
ing set of ports and send a packet to all ports in this
set (multicast/broadcast) or a different port from this
set at different times (ECMP). Moreover, note that
drop and unicast rules are just special cases of mul-
ticast with zero and one element in their forwarding
sets, respectively. Therefore, we only need to define
DiffOutcome for the following three combinations of
rule types: (i) 2×multicast, (ii) 2×ECMP, and (iii)
multicast + ECMP. In all of these cases, we can dis-
tinguish rules again based on either their ports (for-
warding sets) or based on their header rewrites, e.g.,
DiffOutcome(P,R1, R2) := DiffPorts(R1, R2) ∨
DiffRewrite(P,R1, R2). In the rest of this section,
we will assume that rewriting actions are the same for
all ports in the forwarding set and therefore use our
previous definition of DiffRewrite. The case of dif-
ferent rewrites on different ports is accommodated sim-
ply by introducing new predicate DiffRewriteOnPort
and carefully examining whether it is enough to have a
single port with a different rewrite (2 × multicast) or
the rewrite needs to be different on all ports (at least
one rule is ECMP). We provide a more detailed discus-
sion in our technical report [16] and focus now on the
definition of DiffPorts.
If both rules are multicast, a packet will appear on
all ports from one of the forwarding sets. Therefore, if
there exists any port that distinguishes these forward-
ing sets, we can use it to confirm a rule. As such,
DiffPorts(R1, R2) := (F1 6= F2) where F1 and F2 de-
note forwarding sets of R1 and R2 respectively.
If both rules are ECMP, since each rule can send a
packet to any port in its forwarding set, we can reliably
distinguish them only if the forwarding sets do not in-
tersect 2 (a probe appearing at a port in the intersection
will not distinguish the rules as both rules can send a
packet there). Thus, in this case DiffPorts(R1, R2) :=(
(F1 ∩ F2) = ∅
)
.
If only one of the rules (assume R1) is multicast, we
are sure that a packet will either appear on all ports in
F1, or on only one (unknown) port in F2. We can simply
capture the probe on any port that does not belong to
F2. Therefore, DiffPorts(R1, R2) :=
(
(F1 \ F2) 6= ∅
)
.
Finally, there is an additional way to distinguish an
ECMP rule from a multicast rule that is not unicast
(i.e.,|F1| 6= 1). We can differentiate them by counting
received probes (an ECMP rule always sends a single
probe). This way of counting the expected number of
probes on the output is applicable in general and can
extend the definitions of DiffOutcome, but since it
is practically useful only in the presented scenario, we
treat it as an exception rather than a regular constraint.
3.5 Chained tables
Monocle as described so far assumes that each packet
enters a switch on one of its ports, gets matched against
a forwarding table once, and leaves the switch on one of
the ports. In practice, switches may contain a pipeline
of tables that each packet traverses (e.g., chaining tables
abstraction in OpenFlow 1.1). In such a case, Monocle
would require the first table to have additional “fast
forward” rules that redirect the probes to the desired
tables. Similarly, each table needs to have a catching
rule that intercepts the probe. Such design still requires
only one probe per rule and in a sense treats chained
tables in a single switch as a chain of switches, albeit
with a more complicated probe injection mechanism.
3.6 Unmonitorable rules
For some combinations of rules it is impossible to
find a probe packet that satisfies all the aforementioned
constraints, as can be seen in the following examples.
2 There is an alternative, probabilistic approach. Mono-
cle could generate enough probes so that statistically at
least one will differentiate two distinct forwarding sets.
We decided not to use this method because it heavily
relies on the switch hashing function and may fail if the
switch hashes a small subset of header fields.
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First, a rule cannot be monitored if it is completely
hidden by higher-priority rules. For example, one can-
not verify the presence of a backup rule if the primary
rule is actively forwarding packets. Similarly, a rule
is impossible to monitor if it overrides lower priority
rules but it does not change the forwarding behavior,
e.g., a high-priority exact match rule cannot be distin-
guished from default forwarding if the output port is
the same. Finally, it is impossible to monitor rules that
send packets to the network edge as the probes would
simply exit the network. While it is impossible to moni-
tor such egress rules, many deployments (e.g., typically
in a datacenter) use hardware switches only in the net-
work core and use software switches at the edge (e.g.,
at the VM hypervisor). This lessens the importance of
egress-monitoring — the software switches tend to up-
date their data plane instantly and hardware failures
are likely to manifest in the unavailability of the whole
machine; this would be promptly diagnosed by existing
server monitoring solutions.
4. UPDATE MONITORING
Generating probes for monitoring rule updates is sim-
ilar to monitoring a static flow table. In particular, a
probe for rule addition is constructed the same way as
a steady-state probe assuming that rule was already in-
stalled. The only difference is that for some switches,
system should tolerate transient inconsistencies (e.g.,
monitored rule missing from the data plane) and should
not raise an alarm instantly. Instead, Monocle signals
to the controller that the rule is safely in the data plane
once the transient inconsistency disappears.
Similarly, a rule deletion is treated as the opposite
of installation. We look for a probe that satisfies the
same conditions. However, rule deletion is successful
only when the probe starts hitting actions of an under-
lying lower-priority rule. Next, rule modifications keep
the match and priority unchanged. This means that the
probe will always hit the original or the new version of
the rule, regardless of other lower priority rules in the
flow table. As such, we simply make a copy of the (ex-
pected) content of the flow table, adjust it by removing
all lower-priority rules, and decrease the priority of the
original rule. Afterward, we can use the standard probe
generation technique on this altered version of the flow
table to probe for the new rule version.
Finally, a single OpenFlow command can modify or
delete multiple rules. Probing in such a case is simi-
lar to probing for concurrent modification of multiple
overlapping rules at the same time. We describe the
complications of concurrent probing in the next section,
and leave reliable probe generation in the general case
for future work. However, by knowing the content of
switch flow table, it is possible (at a performance cost)
to translate a single command that changes many rules
to a set of commands changing these rules one by one,
and confirm them separately.
4.1 Monitoring multiple rules and up-
dates simultaneously
In steady-state, generating a probe for a given rule
does not affect other probes. Therefore, Monocle gen-
erates and then uses the probes for multiple rules in
parallel. However, after catching the probe Monocle
still needs to match it to the monitored rule. To solve
this problem, we include metadata such as rule under
test and expected result to the probe packet payload
that cannot be touched by the switches. This allows
us to pinpoint which rule was supposed to be probed
by the received probe packet. We use this technique in
both steady-state and dynamic monitoring modes.
When monitoring simultaneous updates, Monocle
must generate probes that work correctly for all already
confirmed rules and at the same time for all subsets3 of
unconfirmed rules sent to the switch. This is required
because the probe must work correctly even when the
switch updates its data plane while other probes are still
traveling through the network. As long as the uncon-
firmed updates are non-overlapping, the updates do not
interfere with each other (see Section 5.4) and we can
generate probes and monitor the updates separately.
Unfortunately, in a general case the problem is more
challenging. Our current implementation handles un-
confirmed overlapping rules by queuing rules that over-
lap with any yet unconfirmed rule until it is confirmed.
We leave probe generation under several unconfirmed
overlapping rules as a potential future work.
To illustrate why probe generation for multiple over-
lapping updates is challenging in a general case, con-
sider the controller issuing three rules (in this order):
• low priority R1 := match(srcIP =
10.0.0.1, dstIP = ∗)→ fwd(1)
• high priority R2 := match(srcIP = ∗, dstIP =
10.0.0.2)→ fwd(2)
• middle priority R3 := match(srcIP =
10.0.0.0/24, dstIP = 10.0.0.0/24)→ drop
After Monocle receives the rule R1, it has to send
it to the switch, generate a valid probe (e.g., P1 :=
(10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2)) and start injecting it. Assume the
controller would then install rule R2. On top of gen-
erating probe P2, Monocle also needs to re-generate P1
as it is no longer a valid probe for R1 (if the switch in-
stalls R2 before R1, P1 will always be forwarded by R2,
and therefore become unable to confirm R1). Addition-
ally, Monocle has to invalidate all in-flight probes P1.
And even if Monocle now receives R3, probing for R3 is
3 According to the OpenFlow specification, a switch can
reorder flow installation commands if they are not sep-
arated by a barrier message. Moreover, some switches
do this even for barrier-separated commands [17].
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impossible until R1 is confirmed (assuming the default
switch behavior is to drop). Similarly, until rule R2 is
confirmed, probe for R3 needs to take into account two
scenarios – either R2 has been installed or not. The
number of such combinations could rise exponentially,
e.g., 5 rules may require considering up to 25 outcomes.
5. SOLVING CONSTRAINTS AND
PACKET CRAFTING
As discussed in Section 3, probe generation involves
creating a probe packet that satisfies a given set of con-
straints. Here we describe how to perform this task by
leveraging the existing work on SMT/SAT solvers.
5.1 Abstracting packets
While constraints from Table 1 are relatively simple,
their complexity is hidden behind predicates such as
Matches(P,R) or DiffRewrite(P,R1, R2). In partic-
ular, when dealing with real hardware, the implemen-
tation of packet matching is performing more than a
simple per-field comparison. Instead, a switch needs to
parse respective header fields and validate them before
proceeding further. For example, a switch may drop
packets with a zero TTL or an invalid checksum even
before they reach the flow table matching step. As such,
it is important to generate only valid probe packets.
While the “wire-format” packet correctness can be
achieved by enforcing packet validity constraints, doing
so is undesirable as such constraints are too complex
(e.g., checksums, variable field start positions depend-
ing on other fields such as VLAN encapsulation, etc.) to
be efficiently solved by off-the-shelf solutions. Similarly
to other work in this field (e.g., [12, 13, 24]), we use an
abstract view of the packet — instead of representing a
packet as a stream of bits with complex dependencies,
we abstract out the dependencies and treat the packet
as a series of (abstract) fields where each field corre-
sponds to a well-defined protocol field (similarly to the
definition of OpenFlow rules).
By introducing abstracted fields, we can solve the
probe generation problem without dealing with the
packet wire-format details. As the final step we need
to “translate” the abstracted view into a real packet.
As we show in the rest of this section, this process con-
tains some technical challenges. While previous work
(e.g., ATPG [24]) uses a similar translation, its authors
do not go into the details of how to deal with this task.
5.2 Creating raw packets
The process of creating a raw probe packet given an
abstracted header can be handled by the existing packet
crafting libraries. The library can handle all relevant
assembly steps (computing protocol headers, lengths,
checksums, etc.). The only remaining task is providing
consistent data to the library. In particular, there are
two requirements on the abstract data that we provide
to the library: (i) limited domains of some fields and
(ii) conditionally present fields.
Limited domain of possible field values. Some
(abstract) packet header fields cannot have arbitrary
values because the packet would be deemed invalid by
the switch (e.g., DL TYPE or NW TOS fields in Open-
Flow). Therefore, we need to make sure that our ab-
stract probe contains only valid values. A basic solu-
tion is to add an additional “must be one of following
values” constraint on the abstract field. This solution
is preferred for small domains (e.g., input port). For
domains that are big, we have an alternative solution:
Assume that field fld can be only fully wildcarded or
fully specified. Moreover, assume that the domain of
fld contains at least one spare value, i.e., a valid value
which is currently not used by any rule in the flow table.
Then, we can run the probe generation step without
any additional constraints and look at the result probe.
If probe[fld] contains a valid value for the domain, we
leave it as is. However, if the probe[fld] contains an
invalid value, we replace it by the spare value.
Lemma: Previous substitution does not affect the va-
lidity of probe.
Informal proof: Assume probe[fld] contains an in-
valid (e.g., out-of-domain) value. As all rules in the
flow table can contain only valid values from the do-
main, it is clear that for each rule R in the flow table
either probe[fld] 6= R.match[fld] or R.match[fld] = ∗.
Setting probe[fld] := spare does not change inequali-
ties to equalities and vice versa as we assume spare is
a value not used by any rule. Thus, the substitution
does not affect the Matches(probe,R) test and there-
fore it preserves validity of the solution with respect to
the given constraints.
Some (abstract) packet header fields are in-
cluded only conditionally. For example, one cannot
include TCP source/destination port unless IP.proto=
0x06. We use a term conditionally-included to denote a
header field that can be present in the header only when
another field is present and has a particular value (e.g.,
TCP source port if the transport protocol is TCP). Sim-
ilarly, a field that cannot be in the header because of the
value of another field (e.g., UDP source port if trans-
port protocol is TCP) is called conditionally-excluded.
While it is easy to remove all conditionally-excluded
fields from the probe solution (e.g., by ignoring their
values), we need to make sure that the solution remains
valid. A particular concern is whether for any rule R the
value of Matches(probe,R) stays the same. We show
that the statement holds if rules are well-formed (i.e.,
they respect conditionally-included fields as required by
the OpenFlow specification ≥ 1.0.1).
Lemma: Eliminating all conditionally-excluded fields
from any valid solution does not change the validity of
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Matches(probe,R) for any well-formed rule R.
Informal proof: We will eliminate all conditionally-
excluded fields one by one. For a contradiction, as-
sume that there exists a conditionally-excluded field
exclfld that during the elimination changes the va-
lidity of Matches(probe,R) for some rule R. Clearly,
exclfld cannot be wildcarded in R otherwise the va-
lidity of Matches(probe,R) would not change. Be-
cause rule R is well-formed and there is an exact
match for exclfld, R has to also include an exact
match for parfld — a parent field of exclfld (i.e., the
field which determines conditional inclusion of exclfld).
However, if probe[parfld] 6= R.match[parfld], value
of Matches(probe,R) is False regardless of the value
of probe[exclfld] which contradicts the assumptions.
Further, if probe[parfld] = R.match[parfld], field
exclfld is conditionally-included which also contra-
dicts the assumptions. Finally, parfld itself might be
conditionally-excluded in probe; in such case we per-
form the same reasoning leading to contradiction on its
parent recursively.
5.3 Solving constraints
Next, we show how to solve the constraints (listed in
Table 1) that the probe packet needs to satisfy. As it
turns out (see Appendix section of technical report [16]),
the problem of probe generation is NP-hard. Therefore,
our goal is to reuse the existing work on solving NP-
hard problems, in particular work on SAT/SMT solvers.
While this requires some work (e.g., eliminating for-
all quantifiers in Hit and Distinguish constraints), our
constraint formulation is very convenient for SAT/SMT
conversion. In particular, we convert the Hit constraint
to a simple conjunction of several ¬Matches terms
and the Distinguish constraint to a chain of if-then-
else expressions: If(m1, d1, If(m2, d2, If(m3, d3, ...)))
where mi and di are in the form of Matches(P,R)
and DiffOutcome(probe,Rprobed, R) for some rule
R; this effectively mimics priority-matching of a
switch’s TCAM. The only remaining part is a
way to model Matches and DiffOutcome predi-
cates. DiffOutcome consists of DiffRewrite and
DiffPorts. Basic set operations allow us to eval-
uate DiffPorts to either True or False before en-
coding to SAT. Both DiffRewrite and Matches are
similar in nature. Therefore, due to space limita-
tions, we use a simple example to present the encod-
ing only for Matches in context of the first three con-
straints. For example, assume that all header fields
are 2-bit wide (including IP source and destination).
The goal is then to generate a probe packet for a low-
priority rule Rlow := match(srcIP=1, dstIP=∗) →
fwd(1) while using probe-catching rule Rcatch :=
match(V LAN=3) and assuming a high-priority rule
Rhigh := match(srcIP=1, dstIP=2) → fwd(2). We
represent probe packet as a sequence of 6 bits p1p2 . . . p6
where bits 1-2 correspond to IP source, bits 3-4 to IP
destination and bits 5-6 to VLAN. Then, Hit and Dis-
tinguish constraints together are Matches(P,Rcatch) ∧
Matches(P,Rlow) ∧ ¬Matches(P,Rhigh) which field-
wise corresponds to (p5-6 = 0b11) ∧ (p1-2 = 0b01) ∧
¬ (p1-2 = 0b01 ∧ p3-4 = 0b10). (where prefix 0b means
binary representation). This can be further expanded
to (p5 ∧ p6) ∧ (¬p1 ∧ p2) ∧ (p1 ∨ ¬p2 ∨ ¬p3 ∨ p4), which
is a SAT instance.
5.4 Consider only overlapping rules
Probe packet generation involves generating a long
list of constraints which need to be satisfied. To increase
solving speed, we strive to simplify the constraints based
on the following observation:
Lemma: Let R be a rule that does not overlap with
Rprobed. Then the presence/absence of R in a switch
flow table does not affect results of probe generation.
Proof: By definition, rules Rprobed and R overlap if
and only if there exists a packet x that matches both.
The negation (i.e., non-overlapping condition) is there-
fore ∀x : ¬Matches(x,Rprobed) ∨ ¬Matches(x,R). As
the expression holds for all packets, it must hold
for probe P as well, i.e., ¬Matches(P,Rprobed) ∨
¬Matches(P,R) holds. Combined with the assump-
tion Matches(P,Rprobed), it implies ¬Matches(P,R).
Therefore, parts of Hit and Distinguish constraints re-
lated to rule R are trivially satisfied for any probe that
matches Rprobed. As a corollary, all rules that do not
overlap with Rprobed can be filtered out before building
constraints. This is a powerful optimization, as typi-
cally rules only overlap with a handful of other rules.
6. NETWORK-WIDE MONITORING
Monocle design allows it to monitor and generate
probes for each switch in the network separately. How-
ever, care must be taken to avoid interference among
catching rules of different Monocle instances. In par-
ticular, each monitored switch could be a downstream
switch for multiple other switches, each of them requir-
ing a catching rule on its own. At the same time, these
catching rules should not match on the probes used to
monitor the switch, otherwise the catching rules at the
monitored switch would intercept all probes instead of
letting them match the monitored rule.
To overcome this problem, a single reserved value of
the probe-catching header field is no longer sufficient.
Instead, we use a solution similar to [2]: we reserve a set
of values of this field, one value per switch: Reserved =
{Si : i is a switch}. The assumptions are again: (i)
production traffic never uses these values in the reserved
field, and (ii) no rule can rewrite this field.
Then, each switch i installs catching rules matching
on match(H = Sj) for each Sj ∈ Reserved\{Si}. Ac-
8
cording to Hit and Collect constraints in Table 1, the
value of field H in a probing packet has to be equal
Si — it cannot match any catching rule at the probed
switch, but must be intercepted by a catching rule at
the downstream switch.
The presented solution has a potential downside: it
requires as many reserved values of field H and as many
catching rules in each switch as there are switches in the
network. However, what matters is that any two con-
nected switches have different identifiers. Finding an as-
signment of labels to nodes in a graph such that no two
connected nodes have the same label value and the to-
tal number of values is minimum is a well-known vertex
coloring problem [19]. While finding an exact solution
is NP-hard, doing so (as our evaluation in Section 8.3.2
suggests) is feasible for real-world topologies. Our study
of publicly available network topologies [14, 21] shows
that at most 9 distinct values are required in networks
of up to 11800 switches. Moreover, the time required
is not crucial as it is a rare effort. Network topology
changes, such as addition of new switches or links, trig-
ger catching rule recomputation. Network failures do
not require recomputation; the setup may simply no
longer be optimal but it is still working.
7. IMPLEMENTATION
We design Monocle as a combination of C++ and
Python proxies. Such proxy-based design enables chain-
ing many proxies to simplify the system and provide
various functionalities (e.g., improving switch behav-
ior by providing update acknowledgments). Moreover,
it makes system inherently scalable — each Mono-
cle proxy is responsible for intercepting only a single
switch-controller connection and can be run on a sepa-
rate machine if needed.
Monocle mainly consists of two proxies — Multi-
plexer and Monitor. Multiplexer connects to Moni-
tors of all monitored switches and is responsible for
forwarding their PacketOut/In messages to/from the
switch. Monitor is the main proxy and is responsible
for tracking the switch flow table, generating the nec-
essary probes, and sending update acknowledgments to
the controller. To reduce latency on the critical path,
Monitor forwards the FlowMod messages as soon as it
receives them, and delegates the probe computation to
one of its workers.
Monocle can use conventional SMT solvers for the
probe generation. In particular, we implement con-
version for Z3 [5] and STP [7] solvers. However, our
measurements indicate that these solvers are not fast
enough for our purposes (they are 3-5 times slower than
our custom-built solver in the experiments presented in
Section 8.2). While we do not know the exact cause,
it is likely that (i) Python version of bindings is slow,
and (ii) SMT solvers often try too hard to reduce the
problem size to SAT (e.g., by using optimizations such
as bit-blasting [7]). While such optimizations pay off
well for large and complex SAT problems, they might
be an overkill and a bottleneck for the probe generation
task. Thus, we wrote our own, optimized, conversion to
plain SAT (we use PicoSAT [1] as a SAT solver). The
conversion and PicoSAT binding is written in Cython4
to be on par with plain C code speed and we use the DI-
MACS format [4] to represent the CNF formulas as one-
dimensional vectors of integers. We use such a single-
dimensional representation instead of a more intuitive
two-dimensional one (vector of vectors of integers, inner
vectors representing disjunctions) because such repre-
sentation resulted in poor performance – in particular,
it necessitated malloc()-ing of too many small objects,
which was the major bottleneck for the conversion.
Finally, since we do not have access to a real PICA8
switch for our evaluation5, we create and use an addi-
tional proxy placed in front of an OpenVSwitch in one
of the experiments. This proxy intercepts and modifies
control plane communication between a controller and
a correctly working, fast switch to mimic the behavior
(rule reordering and premature barrier responses) and
update speeds of the PICA8 switch as described in [17].
8. EVALUATION
In our evaluation, we answer the following questions:
(i) How quickly can Monocle detect failed rules and
links? (in a matter of seconds), (ii) How quick and ef-
fective is Monocle in helping controllers deal with tran-
sient discrepancies between control and data planes?
(it enables correct execution of consistent network up-
dates [20] by providing accurate feedback on rule instal-
lation with only several milliseconds of delay), (iii) How
long does Monocle take to generate probing packets?
(a few milliseconds), (iv) How big is the overhead in
terms of additional rules and additional packets being
sent/received (typically small), (v) Does Monocle work
with larger networks (it does and delays an installation
of 2000 paths for only 350 milliseconds).
8.1 Monocle use cases
We start by showcasing Monocle’s capabilities in both
steady-state and dynamic monitoring modes.
8.1.1 Detecting rule and link failures in steady-
state
To demonstrate Monocle’s failure detection abilities,
we conduct an experiment where we monitor the data
plane of an HP ProCurve 5406zl switch. We connect
this switch with 4 links to 4 different OpenVSwitch in-
stances mimicking a star topology with the switch in
4Do not confuse with CPython, the standard Python
interpreter.
5We already returned a borrowed model used in [17].
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the middle. We run OpenVSwitches and Monocle on
a single 48-core machine based on the AMD Opteron
8431 Processor. To detect failures, we configure Mono-
cle to monitor the switch with a conservative rate of 500
probes/s (Section 8.3), re-send each probe up to 3 times,
and raise an alarm if no probe is received after 150 ms.
In our first experiment, we install 1000 layer-3 forward-
ing rules on the HP switch, and let Monocle monitor
the switch. Afterwards, we fail (remove from the data
plane) a random rule and we measure the time it takes
for Monocle to detect the failure. We repeat the ex-
periment 1000 times and plot the CDF of the resulting
distribution. The results (solid line in Figure 3) suggest
that, depending on where the failed rule happens to be
with respect to the monitoring cycle (Monocle repeat-
edly goes through all the monitored rules), Monocle can
detect the failure in 150 to 3000 ms.
Next, we study how fast Monocle detects failures that
affect multiple rules simultaneously. In this experiment,
we configure Monocle to raise an alarm only after de-
tecting a given threshold (number) of individual rule
failures. During the experiment, we fail multiple rules
simultaneously, or, in one case, fail a whole link to which
102 of the installed rules forward to. We again repeat
the experiment 1000 times and plot the CDF. As the
rest of links in Figure 3 show, Monocle quickly identi-
fies the link failure (on average in 200 ms, out of which
150 ms is the detection timeout). For smaller num-
ber of failures and higher thresholds, Monocle requires
more time as it is unlikely that many (or, in the extreme
case, all) of the failed rules would be covered early in
the monitored cycle.
8.1.2 Helping controller deal with transient in-
consistencies
Some OpenFlow switches prematurely acknowledge
rule installation [15, 17]. As Monocle closely monitors
flow table updates, it can help the controller to deter-
mine the actual time when the rules are active in the
data plane. This in turn allows the controller to perform
network updates without any transient inconsistencies.
We demonstrate this by using Monocle in a scenario
involving an end-to-end network update.
We configure a testbed consisting of three switches
S1, S2 and S3 connected in a triangle, and two end hosts
– H1 connected to S1, and H2 connected to S2. Switch
S3 is the monitored switch exhibiting transient incon-
sistencies between control and data planes. Initially, we
install 300 paths that are forwarding packets belonging
to 300 IP flows from H1 to H2 through switches S1 and
S2. We send traffic that belongs to these flows at a rate
of 300 packets/s per flow. Then, we start a consistent
network update [20] of these 300 paths, with the goal of
rerouting traffic to follow the path S1-S3-S2. For each
flow, we install a forwarding rule at S3 and when it is
confirmed, we modify the corresponding rule at S1. We
repeat the experiments using two different switches in
the role of a probed switch (S3): HP ProCurve 5406zl,
and an OpenVSwitch with a proxy that modifies its be-
havior to mimic the Pica8 switch described in [17]. We
always use OpenVSwitch as S1 and S2.
Because both HP 5406zl and Pica8 report rule instal-
lations before they actually happen in the data plane,
a rule at the upstream switch S1 gets updated in the
vanilla experiment too soon and traffic gets forwarded
to a temporary blackhole. Figures 4a and 4b show when
the packets for a particular flow stop following the old
path, and when they start following the new path. The
gap between the two lines shows the periods when pack-
ets end in a blackhole. In the experiment, a theoretically
consistent network update led to 8297 and 4857 dropped
packets at HP and Pica8 respectively. In contrast, Mon-
ocle ensures reliable rule installation acknowledgments
so both lines are almost overlapping and there are no
packet drops. The total update time is comparable to
the elapsed time without Monocle.
8.2 Monocle performance
Here, we evaluate Monocle’s performance. First,
we answer the question whether Monocle can generate
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Data set avg [ms] max [ms] probes found
Campus 4.03 5.29 10642 / 10958
Stanford 1.48 3.85 2442 / 2755
Table 2: Time Monocle takes to generate a probe
probes fast enough to be usable in practice.
Having access to a dataset containing rules from an
actual Openflow deployment is hard. We observe that
rules in Access Control Lists (ACL) are those most simi-
lar to Openflow rules, since they match on various com-
binations of header fields. Hence we report the times
Monocle takes to generate probes for the rules from
two publicly available data sets with ACLs: Stanford
backbone router “yoza” configuration [12] (called Stan-
ford, with 2755 rules), and ACL configurations from a
large-scale campus network [22] (Campus, 10958 rules).
For each dataset we construct a full flow table and
then ask Monocle to generate a probe for each rule. In
Table 2 we report average and maximum per-rule probe
generation time. On average, Monocle needs between
1.44 and 4.13 milliseconds to generate a probe on a sin-
gle core of a 2.93-GHz Intel Xeon X5647. This time de-
pends mostly on the number of rules, and not on the rule
composition and header fields used for matching. This
is the case because the SAT solver is very efficient and
the most time-consuming part is to check for the rule
overlaps and to send all constraints to the solver. Fur-
ther, our solution can be easily parallelized both across
the switches (separate proxy and probe generator for
each switch) and across the rules sent to a particular
switch (each probe generation in SAT is independent).
Finally, we also show how many probes, compared to
the number of rules, Monocle is able to find (for reasons
why Monocle may fail to find a probe see Section 3.6).
In the measured scenarios, our system was able to gen-
erate probes for the majority of rules.
8.3 Overhead
Next, we show that the act of sending probes does
not overload the switches, and that the catching rules
occupy a small amount of TCAM space in the switches.
8.3.1 PacketIn and PacketOut processing over-
head
While it is possible to inject/collect probes via data
plane tunnels (e.g., VXLANs) to and from a desired
switch, the approach we implemented relies on the con-
trol channel. Therefore, it is essential to make sure
that the switch’s control plane can handle the addi-
tional load imposed by the probes without negatively
affecting other functionality. To quantify the overhead,
we first measure the maximum switch PacketOut rate
by issuing 20000 PacketOut messages, and recording
when they arrive at the destination. To measure the
maximum PacketIn rate, we install a rule forwarding
all traffic to the controller, send traffic to the switch,
and observe the message rate at the controller. The
rates are 7006 PacketOut/s and 5531 PacketIn/s, av-
eraged over 5 runs on an older, HP ProCurve 5406zl
switch. The observed throughputs are 850 and 401 re-
spectively on a modern, production grade, Dell S4810
switch, and 9128 and 1105 on Dell 8132F with exper-
imental OpenFlow support (in all cases the standard
deviation is lower than 3%). If the packet arrival rate
is higher than maximum PacketIn rate available at a
given switch, both switches start dropping PacketIns.
These values assume no other load on the switch.
In the second experiment, we emulate in-progress net-
work updates by mixing PacketOut messages and flow
modifications using the k : 2 ratio (to keep the total
number of rules stable, the 2 modifications are: delete
an existing rule and add a new one). We vary k and
observe how it affects the flow modification rate.
The results presented in Figure 5 show that the per-
formance of all switches is only marginally affected by
the additional PacketOut messages as long as these mes-
sages are not too frequent. All switches maintain 85%
of their original performance if each flow modification
is accompanied by up to five PacketOut messages. Dell
S4810 with all rules having the same priority (marked
with ** in Figure 5) is more easily affected by Pack-
etOuts because its baseline rule modification rate is
higher in such a configuration.
Similarly, we perform an update while injecting data
plane packets at a fixed rate of r packets/s causing r
PacketIn messages/s and observe how they affect the
rule update rate. Figure 6 shows that all switches are al-
most unaffected by the additional load caused by Pack-
etIn messages. Again, Dell S4810 performance drops by
up to 60% when the baseline modification rate is high
(all rules have the same priority, ** in Figure 6).
8.3.2 Number of catching rules required
Recall that our approach for multi-switch monitor-
ing requires multiple probe-catching rules, and these
effectively introduce rule overhead. To quantify this
overhead, we compute the number of catching rules re-
quired for monitoring the network topologies from In-
ternet Topology Zoo [14] and Rocketfuel [21] datasets.
To assign probe-catching rules to different switches, we
use an optimal vertex-coloring solution computed us-
ing an integer linear program formulation; solving takes
only a couple of minutes to compute the results for all
261+10 topologies. The results indicate that the rule
overhead on the switches is marginal – up to 10 probe-
catching rules per switch are sufficient for networks as
big as 754 switches. Rocketfuel topologies confirm this
observation — networks of up to 11800 switches require
at most 9 additional rules.
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8.4 Larger networks
Finally, we show that Monocle can work in larger net-
works without prohibitive overheads. We do not have
access to a large network, therefore, we set up an ex-
periment that consists of a FatTree network built of 20
OpenVSwitches. As before, we add a proxy emulating
Pica8 behavior to each of these switches. Further, each
ToR switch has a single emulated host underneath, run-
ning a hypervisor switch that implements reliable rule
update acknowledgments (also implemented as a proxy
on top of OpenVSwitch). For comparison, we construct
the same FatTree, but consisting of 28 (ideal) switches
with reliable acknowledgments. We ignore the data-
plane traffic to avoid overloading the 48-core machine
we use for the experiment. Monocle is realized as a
chain of three proxies per switch. As already mentioned,
the proxies are highly independent and the problem can
be easily parallelized. Probe generation for each switch
is done in two threads.
We perform an experiment to show how Monocle
copes with high load and what is its impact on up-
date latency. In the experiment the controller issues
an update installing 2000 random paths in the network.
Each update has two phases: (i) install all rules except
for the ingress switch rule, and (ii) install the remain-
ing rule. In the first scenario, we modify all paths in
large batches, starting 40 new path updates (5-7 rule
updates each) every 10 ms. Figure 7 shows that Mono-
cle performs comparably to the network built with ideal
switches. Even though the probes have to compete for
the control plane bandwidth with rule modifications,
the entire update takes only 350 ms longer.
9. RELATEDWORK
Ensuring reliable network operation is important for
network operators. As such, there exist a large amount
of previous work concentrating on different aspects of
the problem. In particular, systems like Anteater [18],
HSA/NetPlumber [11,12], SecGuru [10], VeriFlow [13],
etc., focus on ensuring that the control plane view of
the network corresponds to the actual policy as con-
figured by the network operator. However, problems
such as hardware failures, soft errors and switch im-
plementation bugs can still manifest as an obscure and
undetected data plane behavior. By systematically dis-
secting and solving the problem of probe packet gen-
eration, Monocle, which is an extension of our earlier
short paper on RUM [15], closes the gap and comple-
ments these other works. Monocle monitors the packet
forwarding done at the hardware level and ensures that
it corresponds to the control plane view. While RUM
presents a high level idea of using probes for rule moni-
toring, it does not delve into details of how to generate
these probes. This topic is the main focus of Monocle.
A tool most similar to Monocle is ATPG [24] that also
uses data plane probes to cross-check switch behavior.
However, there are some fundamental differences: (i) to
the best of our knowledge, ATPG generates probes tak-
ing into the account only Hit and Collect constraints.
It never checks whether the probes actually can Dis-
tinguish the rule from a lower priority one. (ii) More
importantly, ATPG takes a substantial time to gener-
ate the monitoring probes it needs. While this approach
works well for static networks, it has serious limitations
in highly dynamic SDN networks. In contrast, Monocle
copes easily with this case, down to the level that it can
observe the switch reconfiguring its data plane during
a network update.
Also working with a data plane, SDN traceroute [2]
concentrates on mechanisms that follow packets in an
SDN network. Traceroute aims to observe switch be-
havior for a particular packet. Our goal is to observe
switch behavior for a particular rule.
Our system is by no means the first to use a SAT
solver – other works [10,18] demonstrate that checking
network policy compliance is feasible by converting the
problem into a Boolean satisfiability question. Monocle
tries to reduce the size and scope of the problem in order
to achieve much finer timescale.
Finally, many systems place a proxy between the con-
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troller and the switches [11,13] to achieve various goals.
We take their presence as an additional confirmation
that such proxies are a viable design.
10. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we address one of the key issues in ensur-
ing reliability in SDN: checking the correspondence be-
tween the network state that the SDN controller wants
to install, and the actual behavior of the data plane in
the network switches. We present a dynamic approach
that exercises rules in switches to ascertain that they are
functioning correctly. In particular, we show how data
plane probe packets should be constructed in a quick
and efficient manner. Our system, Monocle, can work
on a millisecond timescale to generate probe packets
to check when rules are installed in the data plane. In
steady-state, it can detect misbehaving rules in switches
in a matter of seconds.
Acknowledgments
We thank Kirill Bogdanov and the anonymous reviewers
for providing excellent feedback. The research leading
to these results has received funding from the European
Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh
Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant
agreement 259110.
11. REFERENCES
[1] PicoSAT. http://fmv.jku.at/picosat.
[2] K. Agarwal, E. Rozner, C. Dixon, and J. Carter.
SDN traceroute: Tracing SDN Forwarding
without Changing Network Behavior. 2014.
[3] T. Benson, A. Anand, A. Akella, and M. Zhang.
MicroTE: Fine Grained Traffic Engineering for
Data Centers. In CoNEXT, 2011.
[4] D. Challenge. Satisfiability: Suggested Format.
DIMACS Challenge. DIMACS, 1993.
[5] L. De Moura and N. Bjørner. Z3: An efficient
SMT solver. In Tools and Algorithms for the
Construction and Analysis of Systems. 2008.
[6] A. D. Ferguson, A. Guha, C. Liang, R. Fonseca,
and S. Krishnamurthi. Participatory Networking:
An API for Application Control of SDNs. In
SIGCOMM, 2013.
[7] V. Ganesh and D. L. Dill. A Decision Procedure
for Bit-Vectors and Arrays. In CAV, 2007.
[8] B. Heller, C. Scott, N. McKeown, S. Scott,
A. Wundsam, H. Zeng, S. Whitlock,
V. Jeyakumar, N. Handigol, J. McCauley,
K. Zarifis, and P. Kazemian. Leveraging SDN
Layering to Systematically Troubleshoot
Networks. In HotSDN, 2014.
[9] S. Jain, A. Kumar, S. Mandal, J. Ong,
L. Poutievski, A. Singh, S. Venkata, J. Wanderer,
J. Zhou, M. Zhu, J. Zolla, U. Ho¨lzle, S. Stuart,
and A. Vahdat. B4: Experience with a
Globally-Deployed Software Defined WAN. In
SIGCOMM, 2013.
[10] K. Jayaraman, N. Bjrner, G. Outhred, and
C. Kaufman. Automated Analysis and Debugging
of Network Connectivity Policies. Technical
Report MSR-TR-2014-102, MSR, 2014.
[11] P. Kazemian, M. Chang, H. Zeng, G. Varghese,
N. McKeown, and S. Whyte. Real Time Network
Policy Checking using Header Space Analysis. In
NSDI, 2013.
[12] P. Kazemian, G. Varghese, and N. McKeown.
Header Space Analysis: Static Checking for
Networks. In NSDI, 2012.
[13] A. Khurshid, X. Zou, W. Zhou, M. Caesar, and
P. B. Godfrey. VeriFlow: Verifying Network-Wide
Invariants in Real Time. In NSDI, 2013.
[14] S. Knight, H. Nguyen, N. Falkner, R. Bowden,
and M. Roughan. The Internet Topology Zoo.
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
29(9), 2011.
[15] M. Kuz´niar, P. Peresˇ´ıni, and D. Kostic´. Providing
Reliable FIB Update Acknowledgments in SDN.
In CoNEXT, 2014.
[16] M. Kuz´niar, P. Peresˇ´ıni, and D. Kostic´. Monocle:
Dynamic, Fine-Grained Data Plane Monitoring.
Technical Report 208867, EPFL, 2015.
https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/208867.
[17] M. Kuz´niar, P. Peresˇ´ıni, and D. Kostic´. What
You Need to Know About SDN Flow Tables. In
PAM, 2015.
[18] H. Mai, A. Khurshid, R. Agarwal, M. Caesar,
P. B. Godfrey, and S. T. King. Debugging the
Data Plane with Anteater. In SIGCOMM, 2011.
[19] E. Malaguti and P. Toth. A survey on vertex
coloring problems. International Transactions in
Operational Research, 17(1):1–34, 2010.
[20] M. Reitblatt, N. Foster, J. Rexford,
C. Schlesinger, and D. Walker. Abstractions for
Network Update. In SIGCOMM, 2012.
[21] N. Spring, R. Mahajan, and D. Wetherall.
Measuring ISP Topologies with Rocketfuel. In
SIGCOMM, 2002.
[22] Y.-W. E. Sung, S. G. Rao, G. G. Xie, and D. A.
Maltz. Towards Systematic Design of Enterprise
Networks. In CoNEXT, 2008.
[23] TechTarget. Carriers bet big on open SDN.
http://searchsdn.techtarget.com/news/
4500248423/Carriers-bet-big-on-open-SDN, last
visited on Oct 5, 2015.
[24] H. Zeng, P. Kazemian, G. Varghese, and
N. McKeown. Automatic Test Packet Generation.
In CoNEXT, 2012.
13
